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Various contrasts may be observed in the way three Pacific island countries – 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu – exploit their 
natural forest endowments. The modes of exploitation, the efficiency of forest 
revenue systems and the sustainability of forest allocation mechanisms are 
analysed. It is argued that equity issues are also important in forest policy 
given that forests in all three countries are under customary tenure. The forest 
revenue system in PNG is criticised for being inefficient and inequitable. In 
the Solomons the rate of logging is found to be unsustainable, being linked to 
the country’s economic crisis. In Vanuatu a logging ban has stimulated timber 
processing, but probably at a cost to the economy, and has failed to confer 
sustainability on the industry. Changes to forest revenue systems and forest 
allocation procedures that would enhance efficiency, equity, sustainability 
and conservation are identified, along with impediments to these changes.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This article discusses arrangements for the maximisation, and the distribution, of 
resource rents in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, each of 
which possess large forest resources that provide an important source of potentially 
continuous export income. While in each country the exploitation of the forest is in 
the hands of private enterprise, governments regulate and tax the private harvesters 
and in so doing affect the efficiency of harvesting and the distribution of resource 
rents. Landowners, now more dependent on cash income than hitherto, are eager to 
receive a share of logging proceeds. The importance of efficiency and distribution 
issues in forest revenue systems were made explicit by Vincent (1990) and Hyde and 
Sedjo (1992). Three efficiency criteria are employed is this three island comparison. 
The first relates to policy that sustains long-term investment by the private sector. 
The second is the allocation of the forest to uses that will generate the highest social 
benefit. The third relates to the adoption of sustained yield forest management.  
The extraction of forest resources in Papua New Guinea and in the Solomons is 
mainly by private logging companies, often capitalised through foreign direct 
investment, that export raw logs, particularly to markets in Asia. Logging 
concessions are allocated by governments, which attempt to regulate logging 
practices. The resulting resource rents are distributed between private logging 
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companies, forest owners and central government. The central government controls 
the distribution of the rents by imposing log export taxes and by stipulating the 
shares to landowners. It can be argued that the share of resource rents received by 
logging companies − that is, what remains after export taxes and landowner 
payments − should be no more than will induce the companies to maintain their 
investment and to log at the level set by government. This is particularly the case if 
logging companies repatriate their profits overseas. Duncan (1994) investigated the 
distribution of forest rents in Melanesia during a period of high timber prices and 
concluded that the forest revenue systems (i.e. government systems of charges, taxes 
and royalties) were inadequate in capturing resource rents for governments. Since 
then governments have increased the rate of log tax in PNG and the Solomons. In 
Vanuatu, exports have been confined to processed timber since the imposition of a 
ban on log exports in 1993.  
Customary land tenure is still strong in the three countries and the legitimacy of 
this traditional ownership is recognised in their national constitutions. It is therefore 
argued that landowners should receive a share of the resource rent that reflects forest 
ownership.  
Small-scale forestry is practised in all three countries, often by village group 
enterprises exploiting their own forests under customary tenure for domestic and 
export markets, and also by independent processors purchasing logs from 
landowners. Because of the high costs of marketing from remote locations, small-
scale operators tend to be concentrated near major towns and ports. In PNG and the 
Solomons, such operations tend to be located in concessions that have already been 
logged, with logging roads providing ready access to the resource. The resource in 
this case is in the form of standing trees ignored by loggers or logs felled but 
rejected for export. Small-scale processors may also be found in areas that, for 
various reasons, have not been included in logging concessions or have been left 
standing by loggers. Little statistical information is available about these groups, 
who have tended to be ignored by governments, except in Vanuatu. 
 
 
FOREST INDUSTRIES IN THE ECONOMIES OF THE THREE 
COUNTRIES  
 
The criteria by which the importance of forestry can be judged include the 
contribution to Gross National Product (GNP), to export income and to government 
revenue. Data on forestry in GNP are not available, but on the second two measures 
the forest industries are highly important to the economies of the Solomons and 
Vanuatu and relatively less important in PNG. In PNG and the Solomons forestry 
exports are almost all in the form of raw logs. In the Solomons log exports 
contributed no less than 64% of total merchandise exports in 2000 (Table 1) and log 
taxes contributed 15% of total government tax revenue.  
In the PNG economy, the importance of log exports declined from 18% of total 
merchandise exports in 1994 to 7% in 2000. While the absolute value of log export 
tax receipts in 2000 was similar to that in 1994, in relative terms it has declined to 
6% of total tax revenue. This holding up of tax receipts in the face of a log price and 
production decline is a reflection of the interaction between the progressive log tax 
schedule denominated in local currency and currency depreciation. In contrast, the 
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export tax receipts in the Solomons declined markedly over the period (Table 1), 
even though the value of logs remained relatively constant. This was perhaps due to 
the granting of increased tax concessions to logging companies on a case-by-case 
basis by the Solomons government. In contrast to the other two countries, where 
exports are almost all in the form of natural forest logs, Vanuatu’s exports are 
confined to processed natural forest timber, which contributed 14% of total exports 
in 2000.  
Small-scale harvesting and processing operations, based on portable mills, 
number in the hundreds in PNG and the Solomons (Foundation of The Peoples of 
the South Pacific 1995). The small mills contribute to regional economies by 
providing timber for local construction industries and by exporting sawn hardwoods, 
particularly to Australia (Hunt 2001b). Their overall importance is difficult to assess, 
however, given the lack of data on their production and sales.  
When undertaking a forestry sector analysis, it is easy to overlook the economic 
settings that are important to investors in timber industries. Private investment has 
been virtually non-existent in all sectors of the PNG economy for several years 
(Manning 1999, Duncan 2001). The causes are largely poor macro-economic 
management and poor governance, with associated high interest rates and high 
inflation. These impediments have been reinforced by exchange rate uncertainty and 
tax and policy uncertainty with respect to forestry. Similar economic difficulties 
have arisen in the Solomon Islands, where there has been civil unrest and where 
changes in macroeconomic and exchange rate policy have been frequent. 
 
Value-adding  
The importance of forest industries to the economy depends not just on the resource 
rents received but also on the level of domestically-sourced inputs and employment. 
Logging for export in PNG and the Solomons is an enclave industry with limited 
linkages to the rest of the economy.  
There are presently about 50 sawmills, 27 furniture factories, a plywood mill, and 
a woodchip mill in PNG. In addition there are several hundred scattered portable 
sawmills accessing raw logs relatively cheaply and free of tax. The main processed 
exports by volume and value are woodchip, lumber and veneer. The prices for 
lumber exports fall mainly in the range US$200/m3 to US$400/m3. The main 
destinations of processed exports, other than woodchips, are Australia, China and 
Indonesia (FIA 2001). The area of plantations has changed little since 1996. There 
are about 40,000 ha in four main plantations of Eucalyptus and Acacia species for 
woodchips, out of a total of 60,000 ha. Smallholder plantations for balsa wood 
production are unrecorded but estimated at 400 ha (FIA 2001, p. 12). 
A 1997 study demonstrated that timber processing in PNG, even for the domestic 
market, was uneconomical given the landed prices of timber from Indonesia and 
Malaysia (Fortech 1997). Veneer, plywood and fibreboard export still generate only 
marginal returns in PNG due to this low-priced competition. In the case of medium 
and large mills producing sawn timber, the opportunity cost is principally the 
foregone log export tax, the value of which exceeds the benefits of processing 
(Government of Papua New Guinea 2001). Company tax incentives and tariffs that 
operate to encourage processing exacerbate these opportunity costs. In contrast, 
small scale sawmilling does not incur this opportunity cost, because  it uses logs that 
 Table 1. Forest industries in the economy, PNG and Solomons, 1994-2000 
 
Log value export and tax by country Calendar year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
PNG: 
Log export value (Kina M)        
        
         
       
       
       
483 437 453 496 218 386 384
Total merchandise exports (Kina M) 2,662 3,400 3,314 3,059 3,688 4,983 5,793
Log exports as % of total merchandise exports
 
18 13 14 16 6 8 7
Duty or export tax, (Kina M)  
 
137 133 145 154 47 101 136 
Total taxes (Kina M) 1,124 1,208 1,526 1,680 1,598 1,921 2,315
Log tax as % of total taxes  
 
12 11 10 9 3 5 6 
Solomon Islands: 
Log export value (SI$ million) 277 301 367 309 196 251 224
Total merchandise exports (SI$ million) 468 573 577 582 683 725 353
Log exports as % of total merchandise exports
 
59 52 64 53 29 35 64
Duty or export tax (SI$ million) 
 
67 63 69 51 31 46 38 
Total taxes (SI$ million) 241 271 290 286 316 365 260
Log tax as % of total taxes  28 23 24 18 10 12 15 
        
        
        
        
        
         
       
       
Sources: Bank of Paua New Guinea (various), Central Bank of Solomon Islands (various), SGS (various). 
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would not be exported. However, a reduction in the high rate of log tax at current 
low log prices would confer economic viability on large and medium sawmills and 
some processing by reducing opportunity costs. 
The value of processed exports of timber from PNG and the Solomons is reported 
in Table 2. In the Solomons, processed exports are also at a low level compared with 
the value of raw log exports. The recent political turbulence resulted in all major 
foreign direct investors, except the regionally based logging companies, abandoning 
the country. The subsequent economic collapse and the lingering political instability 
make it even less likely than in the past that investors will be attracted to timber 
processing for export. The contraction in the economy has led to an unfavourable 
short and medium term outlook for timber processing even in the small domestic 
market.  
 
Table 2. Processed timber exports PNG and Solomons as percentage of forest 
exports  
 
Processed exports Calendar year 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
PNG (Kina M) 11.3 13 11.5 24.3 19 10.3 25.3 
As % of total forest 
exports  
2.3 3.5 2.2 4.9 8.7 2.6 6.6 
Solomon Islands 
(SI$ million) 
12.4 12.4 12 9.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
As % of total forest 
exports 
4.5 4.1 3.1 3.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Bank of Paua New Guinea (various), Bouro (2001). 
 
Vanuatu’s case contrasts with the other two island nations because its ban on the 
export of raw logs, effective since 1993, means that all timber exports are in 
processed form. Table 3 shows that volume and value of exports has increased 
substantially since the mid-1990s.  
The attraction of domestic processing over the export of the raw product is the 
increased economic activity associated with adding value to the product. In the case 
of timber processing, the economic activity involves investment in land, buildings, 
machinery and vehicles, the purchase of local goods and services and fuel and, 
importantly, the employment of local labour. The increase in investment and 
employment has been achieved in Vanuatu through a ban on logging (which 
effectively subsidises timber processing by reducing the value of logs), and at the 
same time by the imposition of only a modest export duty of 6% on the value of 
processed timber exported.1 In addition to the total royalties paid to Vanuatu 
landowners of US$280,000, forestry worker wages amounted to about US1 M, 
                                                 
1  At the same time, the policy goes so far as to abolish income taxes, corporate taxes, capital gains 
taxes and withholding taxes. Moreover, projects are exempt from customs duties if they 
contribute to employment or generate foreign exchange. In concert with these policies to 
encourage investment is a removal of both foreign exchange controls and limits to foreign 
ownership of Vanuatu businesses (Government of Vanuatu 2001).  
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excluding the earnings of several hundred workers involved part time with portable 
sawmills (Government of Vanuatu 2000, p. 5). The opportunity cost of generating 
the domestic activity associated with the logging ban is the value of raw log exports 
foregone. At current log prices the export of raw logs would not return a great deal 
less than processed exports, and could be achieved at a much lower cost. It would be 
instructive to measure more accurately the economic benefits of Vanuatu’s log 
export ban, taking account not only of the foregone benefit of an efficient level of 
export log tax but also the rate of repatriation of profits by logging companies.  
 
Table 3. Processed timber exports, Vanuatu 
 
Production, and export Calendar year 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Log production, 
plantations (m3) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log production, 
natural forests (m3) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 35,143 39,860 
Processed timber 
exports (m3) 
5,107 4,160 7,940 14,938 12,917 12,219 8,599 
Processed exports 
value, million (Vt) 
255 234 362 515 524 537 434 
Processed exports 
price (Vt/m3)  
50,016 56,233 45,592 34,468 40,579 43,940 50,497 
Note: Year 2000 exports are under-reported (Gerrand 2001). 
Source: Vanuatu Department of Forests (2000). 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE RENT DISTRIBUTION  
 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate the distribution of resource rents over time in PNG and the 
Solomons respectively. Resource rent is defined as f.o.b. price, less operating cost of 
logging, i.e. no normal profit margin has been included in costs.2  
The sharp increase in the PNG government’s share of resource rents in year 2000 
and 2001 has two causes. First, the government’s mini budget of August 1999 
reintroduced the harsher tax schedule that it had suspended in 19983, and second, the 
average kina price of export logs rose due to depreciation of the kina against the US 
dollar. Given that the export tax is progressive, a greater share of the higher price 
was captured in tax. In 2001, 81% of the resource rent available from logging was 
captured by the PNG government. Table 4 shows that the log tax and landowner 
benefit together amount to K152 M, while the rent available is only K145 M, the 
difference being loss incurred by loggers. While the landowner share of resource
                                                 
2  Hunt (2002a) suggested that a normal profit of 20% of total costs, plus a share of super profits, 
be incorporated in the design of a forest revenue system in PNG.  
3  The 1995 tax schedule was introduced after Duncan (1994) had pointed to the fact that a large 
proportion of resource rent was being appropriated by logging companies during the high price 
years of 1992 and 1993.  
 
 Table 4. Shares of forest resource rents in PNG 
 
Production, export and rent shares Calendar year 
 
1994        1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Log production, plantations (m3)         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. Log production, natural forests (m3)         
         
         
          
         
         
        
2.94 2.51 2.61 3.01 1.61 1.98 1.99 1.91
3. Log production total (m3) 2.94 2.51 2.61 3.01 1.61 1.98 1.99 1.91
4. Log export value (Kina M) 483 437 453 496 218 386 384 346
5. Log export price, (Kina /m3) (row 4/row 3) 164 174 174 165 135 194 193 181
6. Duty or export tax (Kina M) 137 133 145 154 47 101 136 118 
7. Landowner benefit (Kina M) 41 35 43 54 24 36 36 34
8. Logging costs (Kina /m3) 50 58 66 74 82 89 97 105
9. Resource rent total (Kina M) (row 4-row 8) 336 291 281 274 86 208 190 145 
10. Govt. share of rent (%) (row 6/row 9*100) 41 46 52 56 55 48 72 81 
11. Landowner share of rent (%) (row 7/row 9*100) 12 12 15 20 28 17 19 23 
12. Loggers’ share of rent (%) 
    ((row 9-row 6-row 7)/row 9*100) 
47 42 33 24 17 34 9 -5
Sources: SGS (various), Duncan (1994), Hunt (2002). 
 
 Table 5. Solomon Islands: shares of resource rent 
 
Production, export and rent shares Calendar year 
 1994        1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Log production, plantations (m3) 0.079 0.090 0.100 0.083 0.072 0.075 0.064 0.078 
2. Log production, natural forests (m3)         0.580 0.659 0.733 0.607 0.532 0.547 0.472 0.5
3. Log production total (m3) 0.659        0.749 0.833 0.69 0.604 0.622 0.536 0.65
4. Log export value (SI$M)         277 301 367 309 196 251 224 245
5. Log export price (SI$/m3) (row 4/row 3)         420 402 440 448 325 403 419 377
6. Duty or export tax (SI$M) 67        63 69 51 31 46 38 41
7. High landowner royalty (SI$M)         80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
8. Low landowner royalty (SI$M)         30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
9. High landowner in kind (SI$M)         40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
10. Low landowner in kind (SI$M)         6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
11. High landowner benefit total (SI$M)         120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
12. Low landowner benefit total (SI$M)         36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
13. Logging costs (SI$/m3) 150        156 162 168 173 179 185 191
14. Resource rent total (SI$M) (row 4-(row 13*row 3))         178 184 232 194 92 139 125 121
15. Govt. share of rent (%)(row 6/row14*100) 38        34 30 26 34 33 30 34
16. High landowners’ share of rent (%)  
      (row11/row14*100) 
67        65 52 62 131 86 96 99
17. Low landowners’ share of rent (%)  
      (row12/row14*100) 
20        20 16 19 39 26 29 30
18. High loggers’ share of rent (%)  
      ((row 14-row16-row 6)/row 14*100) 
42        46 55 55 27 41 41 36
19. Low loggers’ share of rent (%) 
      ((row 14-row17-row 6)/row 14*100) 
-5        1 19 12 -65 -19 -26 -34
Sources: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (various), Bouro (2001). 
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rent is estimated to have increased  to 23% in 2001  –  almost double that  of the mid 
1990s − it is nevertheless less than a third of the government’s share. 
In PNG, to regularise the payment of landowner benefits all new timber permits 
since July 1966 have stipulated a level of Producer Development Benefit (PDL), 
based on log export price, in addition to a fixed (per cubic metre) landowner royalty. 
In effecting this change with respect to existing permits any in-kind and financial 
benefits paid to landowners were required to amount to the value of the PDL. Any 
premiums negotiated directly between landowners and timber companies in addition 
to this PDL have not been included in the calculation of landowner benefits in Table 
4. 
An efficient tax system is one that maximises and sustains rents and to do this it 
must allow sufficient profits to be made by the private loggers to maintain 
investment. The evidence from Table 4 is that logging companies in PNG are on 
average having difficulty in making profits, suggesting that there will be an 
accelerating disinvestment in export logging 
The government’s share of forest resource rent in the Solomon Islands has 
remained relatively constant (Table 5). However, landowners receive a highly 
variable share of rents, compared with PNG, depending on various royalty and in-
kind benefits negotiated. It is likely that the rent share of landowners accords with 
the ‘low’ estimates of Table 5 and that the loggers’ share accords with the ‘high’ 
estimates because loggers are unlikely to agree to levels of royalties and benefits that 
leave them with negative shares. It is suggested therefore that the rent is presently 
distributed relatively uniformly among Solomon Island stakeholder groups, each 
receiving about a third. 
 
Transfer pricing and rent distribution  
It was shown that the forest revenue system of PNG appropriates a large proportion 
of the resource rents available, thus tending to deter investment by the private sector, 
stifling production and reducing the total of resource rents. An additional factor 
diminishing the rents received by all stakeholders is transfer pricing by which 
foreign wholesalers appear to gain a share of resource rents. Wholesalers do this by 
paying a price lower than market price to the log exporter, which allows them to 
make an extra margin of profit when realising the full wholesale price of logs in 
overseas markets. The actual prices paid to logging companies in PNG by foreign 
traders are documented by the authorities and form the basis for the payment of log 
tax. Even after allowing for costs of insurance and freight and any quality 
differential that might exist between PNG logs and wholesale prices quoted, the log 
prices paid to logging companies are lower than those quoted for wholesale markets 
in Japan. In 1999, 1M m3 of logs, or half of PNG’s production, was exported to 
Japan. It is estimated (Hunt, 2002) that in PNG in1999 resource rent leakage due to 
transfer pricing − borne by landowners loggers and government − totalled between 
K26 M and K52 M  (Table 6). If it occurred, the ‘kickback’ of a proportion of the 
benefits of transfer pricing received by wholesalers to logging companies would 
reduce the estimated income loss by loggers. 
Transfer pricing also seems to affect log prices in the Solomons. The value of 
logs destined for Korea and China was estimated by the Ministry of Forests, 
Environment and Conservation (2001) to average about US$17.08/m3 or SI$85/m3 
less than suggested by market price information. The implication is that about 13% 
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of resource rents in these two markets, which make up about a third of the 
Solomons’ total market, was being transferred offshore to log buyers. The 
difficulties of investigating transfer pricing are exacerbated by the dense and 
complicated nature of timber wholesaling in Japan.  
 
Table 6. Estimated losses of rents due to transfer pricing in PNG in 1999 
 
Loss by stakeholder    Kina (M) 
Revenue loss to government  18 − 37 
Producer benefit loss to landowners  2 − 4 
Income loss to loggers  6 −11 
Total loss 26 − 52 
Source: Hunt (2002). 
 
 
Distribution of benefits to resource owners 
One measure by which to compare benefits received by the resource owners in the 
three countries is the income they received per cubic metre of log harvested. In 
Vanuatu’s case only processed timber has been exported since 1993, the price of 
exported processed timber averaging US$308 in year 2000. As expected, the value-
added component of exported processed timber is captured by the processor, 
lowering the relative shares received by government and landowners. Eighty eight 
percent of the value of processed timber exports in 1999, of Vt537 M, was captured 
by processors (Vanuatu Department of Forests 2000).  
Comparing landowner benefits in the three countries in Table 7 reveals that 
benefits ranging between US$6 for PNG and US$24 for the Solomons. As a 
percentage of log price, landowner benefits were 8% in PNG, 9% in Vanuatu and up 
to 29% in the Solomons. If the lower estimates are taken for the Solomon Islands 
then the percentages differ little from those found to be applying in 1992 and 1993 
by Duncan (1994). 
 
Table 7. Summary of estimated landowner benefits, PNG, Solomons and Vanuatu, 
2000  
 
Landowner benefit Country 
      PNG        Solomons       Vanuatu 
Log volume, M m3  1.992 0.472 0.035 
Landowner benefit local currency (lc),M 36 36-120 33 
Exchange rate, US$/lc  0.33 0.196 0.007 
Landowner benefit US$/m3 6 7-24 6.6 
Average log export price US$/m3 72.1 81.78 76.9 
Landowner benefit as % of log export price 8 9-29 9 
Note: The average log export price in the case of Vanuatu is imputed. 
Sources: SGS (various), Central Bank of Solomon Islands (various), Bouro (2001) and Vanuatu 
Department of Forests (2000).  
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FOREST POLICY ANALYSIS  
 
Efficiency issues  
On the evidence in Table 4, log companies in PNG have continued to produce by 
deferring capital costs. It is inevitable that disinvestment will eventually take place if 
the industry cannot cover its full costs. The introduction of a resource rent based tax 
(instead of one based on log price) would avoid the risk of over-taxing the industry 
(see Hunt, 2002). Moreover, a lower tax rate may well achieve a higher level of 
revenue − lower taxation equates to a higher price for logs. It has been suggested 
(Hunt, 2000) that tax revenue is elastic with respect to price, i.e. the reduction in 
revenue from a reduction in tax rate would be more than compensated by the 
increased tax take on a higher volume of production. To achieve higher production, 
however, new concessions will need to be opened up.  
 
Allocation of forest resources 
The rate and manner of allocation of forest resources for exploitation are in the 
purview of Governments. In PNG many of the concessions awarded a decade or 
more ago are now nearing the end of their economic life. It is planned to allocate 
new concessions under Forest Management Agreements (FMAs). These concessions 
cover 11M ha of the estimated available commercial forest of 22 M ha. Within the 
FMAs there are ostensibly sufficient timber resources to be able to implement 
sustained yield management, with one thirty-fifth of the concessions being logged 
each year. (Even if the 35-year cutting cycle were adhered to in PNG there are 
doubts whether the forest will recover in that period.)  
An official review of the FMA process found that forest volume inventories, 
which are the basis on which the FMAs are to be sustainably exploited, were in 
many cases overestimated (Everts 2001). Moreover, a recent review of forest 
resources available suggests that only 6.7M ha of the allocated 11M ha is 
commercial forest (Shearman and Cannon 2002, Figure 4). Consequently, logging 
companies will need to operate on a shorter cycle than 35 years (in some case much 
shorter) to achieve the throughput of logs they need to attain financial viability. This 
shortcoming in providing the inputs to basic forest management raises questions 
about the government’s ability to make the long-term commitment required to 
implement sustained yield management.  
The economic value of forests may have been higher in some other use, such as 
small-scale forestry or conservation, but these options are never tested by the PNG 
Forest Authority before it bundles the resource. It is questionable whether the 
government should to be the agent for the appropriation of customary landowners’ 
forest resources for logging, while at the same time determining that landowners will 
receive only 23% of rents. Moreover, there is a conflict of interest in the 
government’s desire to maximise resource rents and in its responsibility to conserve 
areas of forest of high biological value. It is therefore proposed that the government 
vacate its pro-active role and allow the forest owners to negotiate with parties who 
wish to exploit or conserve their forest resources (Stocker 2002). The role of the 
PNG Forest Authority would then be confined to regulation, ensuring the 
implementation of forest management plans and fair dealing by the parties. The 
benefits received directly by landowners would accord with negotiated agreements 
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reached (with loggers or conservation organizations), while resource taxes would be 
extracted on export, as they are presently.  
 
Policy and sustainability  
In the Solomons, the policy chosen for the maximisation of revenues from forestry is 
the maximisation of the volume of log exports, rather than higher rates of log export 
tax. The logging industry is the only major exporter to survive the economic 
collapse of 2000-2001. Exports were only mildly depressed in 2000, because of the 
reluctance of log ships to call into the Solomons during the hiatus. However, with 
that restraint removed, and with government encouragement, it is likely that exports 
have grown. The share of the rent captured by the loggers, about 40% (Table 5), 
together with the freedom to repatriate capital, appear sufficient for them to respond 
to the government’s urging. Log volumes have been in excess of sustainable yield, 
resulting in a depleted inventory. According to Sheehan (2000, p. 126), the 
sustainable harvest rate is 250,000 m3 per year. In contrast, the current rate is about 
500,000 m3 a year. Bouro (2001) suggested to the author that there was some 3.5 M 
m3 of timber left unharvested, while an AusAID forester based in the Solomons 
(Raymond 2001) suggested that there was about 4.0 M m3 of timber available. At 
present harvest rates the resource will last only seven or eight years on these 
estimates. However, the government’s view is obviously that the financial flows 
from logging are much more useful now, in its time of crisis, than in the future. It is 
hoped by the government that plantation forestry will be able to fill the export gap 
left by exhausted natural forests. Presently plantations generate only about 15% of 
total log exports, but attracting the necessary amounts of private investment needed 
to expand plantation production six-fold would seem to be out of the question in the 
present socio-economic climate.  
National estimates of sustainable yields from logging are in theory vital to the 
achievement of sustained yield management. However, national estimates are 
dangerously misleading in Pacific islands. This is because it is usual for logging to 
be concentrated in particular islands or provinces. In the case of Vanuatu, the spatial 
unevenness of logging is well illustrated. While the total annual log output of around 
40,000 m3 of log is well within the national estimated sustainable yield of 68,000 m3, 
the year 2000 harvest on six of the 10 islands of the country exceeded sustainable 
volumes. Another sustainability issue highlighted in Vanuatu is selective logging by 
species. On the island of Santo, the focus of the industry, 97% of the timber harvest 
in 2000 came from just two favoured species. Such selective harvesting is a problem 
mainly associated with fixed mills producing for export, rather than with portable 
mills that tend to cut a range of species for both local and export markets (Vanuatu 
Department of Forests 2000, pp. 5-6). The codes that govern logging companies in 
PNG and the Solomons specify that all species over a specific diameter must be 
taken.  
  
Policy for small-scale forestry  
In PNG and the Solomons there are very many portable milling operations. This 
option is not usually adopted as an alternative to industrial logging but is usually 
exercised in areas that have been already logged or that are non-commercial due to 
slope or other physical factors. Therefore it does not usually incur an opportunity 
cost to the government. Small-scale forestry, that is ecologically sustainable, or 
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‘eco-forestry,’ is practised in all three countries by a relatively small number of 
organised landowner groups (Hunt 2002b). The costs of formation of the groups and 
of certification have meant that they are viable only with heavy subsidisation. The 
attractiveness to donors to the programme is the conservation of forest and the 
transfer of skills to the groups. There are moves afoot to reduce the cost of group 
certification to facilitate access to niche markets for certified timber in Australia, 
Europe and the USA.  
The making of recommendations for more regulation and better enforcement to 
ensure sustainable practices in small-scale forestry are often unrealistic in PNG and 
the Solomons given the weakness of their governments. However, a licence fee for 
portable mills would offset some of the cost of administration. The expanded 
training and extension functions of the forest services could well be outsourced to 
independent companies along with other forestry services concerned with 
compliance and enforcement.  
 
Forest conservation policy 
The lack of designated forest conservation areas in both PNG and the Solomon 
Islands reflects a government bias towards industrial harvesting, but also the 
difficulty of establishing conservation areas where customary tenure prevails.4 The 
lack of awareness on the part of conservation non-government organizations 
(NGOs) that they need to compete financially for forest resources with governments 
has also restricted the establishment of conservation areas. Policy change in this area 
will be difficult given that governments are concerned with maximising their 
revenues rather than social benefits. Nevertheless, acquisition of forest through long-
term leases from customary owners needs to be pursued vigorously before all areas 
of high conservation value are logged or converted to other uses.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Efficiency and sustainable management criteria may be applied to the organisation 
of forest industries. Achievement of maximum social benefit is compromised in 
PNG and the Solomons by the allocation of forest concessions by governments 
without consideration of the alternatives to industrial logging. Donors and NGOs 
need to be able to compete for areas of high conservation value. Nor is the 
alternative of small-scale forestry using portable sawmills promulgated by the 
governments when negotiating with landowners to form logging concessions 
because it would lead to fragmentation of the concessions. There would be an 
economic cost to government, in the form of log export tax foregone, in promoting 
alternative uses in areas that would be logged. However, it was demonstrated that in 
the case of PNG the rate of tax is inefficiently high, and lowering of the log export 
tax would also lower the opportunity cost of small-scale forestry.  
In the Solomons, the government is focused on managing industrial forestry to 
maximize short-term revenue flow rather than for sustained yield. In PNG the heat 
has tended to go out of the debate about sustained yield management because 
                                                 
4  Included in forest conservation is the practice of sustainable forest management that attempts to 
maintain the non-monetary values of the forest.  
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logging volumes have been declining under a heavy log export tax. The new Forest 
Management Agreement Areas (FMAs) are designed to generate sustained yields 
but in practice the government failed to undertake proper resource inventories that 
would make this possible. It remains to be seen whether the political and financial 
inputs will be sufficient to revive the objectives implicit in the FMAs. Also, there is 
no guarantee that logged forests will recover sufficiently for a viable second cut or 
that the forest will not be converted to some other use such as agriculture. The 
difficulty of implementing sustained yield management was reinforced by the case 
of Vanuatu where even with a logging ban there is overexploitation.  
The importance of the forest revenue system in maximising a sustainable flow of 
resource rents was illustrated in the case of PNG. The government’s log export tax, 
by absorbing most resource rents, has already reduced production and stifled 
investment. The replacement of the log tax based on price with one based on 
resource rent would avoid this situation. Transfer pricing appears to be costly to log 
exporting countries. However, addressing the issue is extremely difficult given the 
impenetrable nature of wholesale markets in Japan. 
There is a strong case that customary forest owners should receive a greater share 
of resource rents. Governments have the power to restructure forest revenues system 
to achieve greater equity. However, such a change is unlikely in the short run in 
PNG or the Solomons given that greater equity would be achieved at the expense of 
governments’ share of resource rent.  
Vanuatu provided a contrast to the other two countries by almost eschewing taxes 
and stimulating investment and employment, thus almost all resource rents are 
captured by the private timber processors. It would be instructive to analyse further 
the benefits and costs of this radical forest policy. 
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